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THE DETERMINANTS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT POLICE
EXPENDITURES: A PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT APPROACH
ROY W. BAHL, RICHARD D. GUSTELY, AND MICHAEL J. WASYLENKO*
ABSTRACT

Explanation
government
government
police police
expenditures
of the isexpenditures level of local is

Explanation of the level of local governgenerally drawn from the results of em-

ment police expenditures is generally

pirical analyses. However, the assump-

drawn from the results of empirical analtions of the underlying statistical model
yses. However , the assumptions of the unare not realistic for the police function
derlying statistical model are not realistic

for the police function and as a conse-

quence the regression results do not provide

and as a consequence the regression re-

sults do not provide useful clues as to the

reasons for either the rapid growth in
useful clues as to the reasons for either
police spending and employment or the
the rapid growth in police spending and

employment or the wide variation in per

capita expenditures among cities. This
paper shows - within the context of a
traditional consumer maximization
model - how the socio-economic charac-

wide variation in per capita expenditures
among cities.

The objective in this paper is to offer
an alternative positive theory of police

expenditures. Specifically, it is our intent

to show - within the context of a tradi-

teristics and fiscal capacities of a commutional consumer maximization model nity determine the level of police expendihow the socio-economic characteristics
tures through the effects of these charac-

and fiscal capacities of a community deteristics on the level of police wages and
termine the level of police expenditures
employment. The model is developed by
through the effect of these characteristics
combining an existing body of public fion the levels of police wages and employnance research with a growing body of
ment. We test the model using fiscal data
labor economics research dealing with the
for the year 1972 for a cross-section of
state and local government sector, particu79 metropolitan area city governments
larly with estimating the employment dewith populations above 100,000. 1
mand function and the determinants of
the wage rate. Our results suggest that
important explanatory variables have been
I. The Determinants Literature
excluded from earlier expenditure determinants studies and have led to serious
The absence of a generally accepted
problems in interpreting statistical results.
theory of the determination of local govMoreover , our estimation of a structural
ernment expenditures has given rise to
model facilitates interpretation of the connumerous attempts to identify statisticaltributions of supply and demand variables
ly the determinants of these expenditures.
to public expenditure levels as well as
The rationale for such studies is straightenabling us to trace exogenous shocks
forward: how communities actually reveal
through the model to their ultimate effects
preferences for public goods in a context
on employment, compensation and ex- of varying or changing community charpenditure levels.
acteristics is essentially an empirical
question.2 Accordingly, these statistical
*The authors are, respectively, Professor of Eco- analyses usually have involved estimating
nomics at Syracuse University, Assistant Professor
of Economics at the University of Tennessee, and a relationship between per capita local
Assistant Professor of Economics at The Pennsylvaniagovernment expenditures and varying
State University. Helpful suggestions were receivedsets of socio-economic and demographic
from Professors Jesse Burkhead, Jerry Miner and
variables (e.g., racial mix, population denEdward Grämlich. This research was supported under
a Ford Foundation grant to the Metropolitan Studies
Program of the Maxwell School of Syracuse Universi-

ty.

sity) and elements of the budget constraint
(e.g., per capita state and federal aid) and
identifying those variables with statisti-
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II. The Model as the "detercally significant coefficients

minants."
The statistical results derived in the
more careful of these studies have tended

Local government current expenditure

on the police function (EXP) is the sum
of direct labor costs (L), pension and fringe
to square with economic theory, though
benefit costs (F) and nonlabor expendithe basic assumptions of the model particularly the output proxy choice - es- tures such as uniforms, equipment and
supplies (S). Direct labor costs, in turn,
timation problems and data incompaare the product of average wage (W) and
rabilities are common criticisms (Morss,
1966). However, two important problems
with this approach have not been adequately drawn out. The first relates to
the nature of the choice model implied
when expenditures are used as an argument in a utility function as the proxy
for public sector output. The implication

the number of employees (N); pension and
fringe benefit costs are assumed to be some

proportion (a) of the total wage bill; and
nonlabor current expenditures some

amount (ß) per employee. Hence, the basic
expenditure identity is:

EXP = N [W(l + a) + ß] (1)
from either an increase in public goods
The research question posed here is
consumed or from an increase in the price
of those goods. An alternative view of the
do variations in community characimplications of using the expenditureteristics and local government fiscal ca-

is for an individual to derive satisfaction

proxy for public output is a very unrealispacity act to affect expenditures through

tic assumption that the price of public
their effects on employment and com-

goods does not vary across the government
pensation. Empirically, the goal is to deunits studied. The second major weakness
velop structural equations to estimate
in these studies is their consideration of
W(1 + a) and N, and to calculate ß in order
only the reduced-form expenditure equato derive the elasticity of police expendition. Such an approach masks important
tures with respect to the exogeneous variables in the model.
relationships and therefore makes it difficult to explain the process by which anyThe model developed is for a community

particular determinant affects expendiwhich produces and consumes a public

tures. These weaknesses severely limit good
the (police), other public goods (Z), and
explanatory power of determinants analyprivate goods (X) at prices [W(l + a)
ses.
+ ß], Pz, and Px, respectively. The proxy
In recent years, a related literature
has
for the police
good is employment in the
emerged - centering on the determinants
police sector (N), and it is only from
of public sector employment
and wage
increments
in private goods, other public
rates - which partially takes into
goods account
and police employment that any
these two shortcomings.3 This work,
increment in utility is derived.4 Implied
however, is more directly relevant to labor here is a Leontief type fixed-factor promarket considerations and does not atduction function for the police sector. Spetempt to use the determinants of cifically,
public we assume that the increment
sector wage rates and employmentoflevels
one unit of employment-output must
for the determination of the level of
be govaccompanied by a fixed amount of

ernment expenditures (e.g., there nonlabor
is no
inputs, with the latter being
concern with the comparative effects
valuedof
at ß. In order to get a unit of output
increased wage rates and increased em(a policeman), the police department must
ployment levels on increases in public
absorb the cost of a uniform, a billy club,
expenditures).
some fraction of the cost of a car, disThe analysis in this paper takes the
patching equipment, etc.5
research on public sector compensation
Certainly, police employment is not a
and employment levels into account in perfect proxy for police output, but there
redefining a positive theory of local gov- are strong arguments that it may be the
ernment police expenditures.
best available proxy. It clearly is superior
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expenditure
in n
police function has asurrogate
relatively low level
of capital expenditures.
argument in the utility function; hence,
The aggregate community preference
it allows definition of a budget constraint function then, is
which permits inter-city variations in the
price of police output. The very high labor U = U(N, Z, X) (2)
intensity of the local public sector, particwhich is to be maximized
ularly the police function, lends some
credence to the assumption that changes
budget constraint
in output and employment are proportionto

the

public

including the public good price as an

al. Finally, whether changes in police

employment and police output are propor-

Y + AID = (W[l + a] + ß)N + PzZ

tional is less relevant than whether the

+

PxX

(3)

where AID = any lump-sum grant
from a higher level govmakers) think they are. While it seems

community (or community decision

reasonable to assume that the consumer-

voter would see his welfare as being raised
by increases in the number of policemen
on the street, it seems unlikely that the

ernment

W = the wage received by police employees
Y = income in the communi-

same individual would see his welfare as

ty after the imposition of

taxes by all higher level
governments

being increased (at least in the short run)

by increments in the wage rate paid policemen. Certainly politicians, who translate community preferences into year-toyear budget changes, would tend to take

this view.

Př = price of other public

goods
Px = price of private goods

The choice of the police function for Maximizing (2) subject to (3) yields standard first order conditions which imply
application of this model has certain
important advantages, some of which do that police employment is determined by
not hold for other public functions. It is the price of police employees, the price
always a municipal government function
and, therefore, the fiscal statistics are

of other public goods, the price of private
goods, the income level, and the grant-incomparable and not distorted by special aid level of the city.
district arrangements. In addition, there
are not good private sector substitutes for

III. Empirical Model and Data
the bulk of services provided by police
This estimation involves using three
departments; hence it seems reasonable
to assume that intercity variations in
structural equations - a compensation
police expenditures are not markedly af- equation, an employment equation, and

fected by different mixes of publicly and a crime equation - in order to identify the

privately provided police services. Police determinants of intercity variations in
police compensation rate and employment.
employment is relatively homogeneous - 83 percent, on average, are uniformed - making more credible the neces-

A. The Compensation Equation
sary assumption in this model that the

composition of the police labor force does The average total compensation of policemen is specified here as a function of
not vary with factors that affect the wage
and employment level, and that police a set of community characteristics which
productivity does not vary among our include the opportunity wage of a policeman in the private sector, the overall skill
cross-section of cities beyond what variations in average education level would level of workers in the metropolitan area,
the level of unionization of the police force,
lead one to expect.6 Finally, we limit this
and the level of police employment.
analysis by concentrating only on explaAverage total compensation of policemen
nation of current expenditures, and the
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The sign
of the opportunity
(TC) is average wage and
salaries
of po- wage,
andand
police fringe
employment varilicemen plus averageunionization
pension
ables is expected to be positive. The sign
benefit payments.7
of the education
variable cannot
be stated
The opportunity wage
has been
shown
a priori. To
thepublic
extent it measures
quality
a significant determinant
of
sector

differences that (Schmenner,
are not reflected in the
wage rates in other studies
opportunity wage variable, the expected
1973; Ehrenberg, 1973; Ashenfelter,

1971), though the measure chosen to rep- sign of the regression coefficient will be

positive. To the extent a high education
level
analysis, the opportunity wage (OW)
is in the city implies a larger supply
of qualified applicants, the expected sign
measured as the average yearly earnings
of-the education variable is negative.
of manufacturing sector employees

resent this effect has varied. In this

lagged by one year. The rationale for using

such a variable is the assumption that
B. The Employment Equation

a local labor market exists, and, hence,

there is a wage roll-out from the basic The demand for police employees is
to the service (including public) sector.8 specified as a function of the price of a
This expected positive relation between police employee, the price of other public
wage rates in the two sectors can result goods, the price of private goods, the infrom either competitive forces which tend come and grant-in-aid level in the city,
to erase wage differentials, or a demon- and taste or preference variables. The
stration effect which causes public em- dependent variable is full-time equivalent
ployee unions to demand wages roughly police employment, expressed per 1,000
equivalent to those obtained by private of population (Np. The price of a police
sector unions. The choice of the manufac-

employee is specified as the average total

turing wage as the opportunity cost to a compensation of an employee plus the
policeman reflects an assumption that the necessary expenditure on nonlabor inputs
most likely alternative employment forper employee (TC -I- ß). The average wage
policemen is blue-collar manufacturing rate in the other four common city func-

tions was used to measure the price of
that police wages are affected by skill other public goods. However, this variable
differences between police and manufac- is highly correlated (r = .8) with police
occupations. To adjust for the possibility

turing employees, we include the median compensation and was dropped from the

education of the city population over 25 empirical analysis. The price of private
years of age (ED). The education variable commodities (Px) is measured as an index
may also adjust, cet. par., for the greater of the cost of living in the SMSA (See
supply of qualified police applicants in Appendix A) and is treated as an exogecities where average education level is

higher (see Ehrenberg, 1973b).
O. Ashenfelter (1971), R. Ehrenberg

nous variable. Income (Yp) and grants-inaid per thousand population (Gp) are used

to describe the level of resources available

to the community. Four variables are
entered to account for intercity variations
in preferences for police services: populacant effect on the level of wage rates. The tion size (POP), median education level
(ED), the crime rate per thousand populaextent of public sector unionization (U)
tion in 1972 (C72), and the percentage
in a city is measured by the portion of
police employees who are affiliated with of the city population who are nonwhite
the union (U) and it is assumed that larger (NW). The demand for police employees
is stated as:
fractions imply stronger unions.
The police employment variable is meaNp = f(TC + ß, Px, Yp, Gp,
sured as total police employment per
(1973), and R. Schmenner (1973) in re-

search on police and fire salaries find
evidence that unionization has a signifi-

thousand population (Np). The relation- POP, ED, C72, NW) (5)

ship for police compensation is:

TC = f(OW, ED, U, Np) (4)

Except for (TC + ß) and ED, t

of all the coefficients of the variables are
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associated with the
crime rate.
Therefore,
expected to be positive.
The
sign
of the

coefficient of the price
of a police
a positive coefficient
for incomeemployee
would

is expected to be negative.
The
coefficient
indicate, other things
being equal,
that
of the median education
the greater thevariable
affluence the higher
may
is
be
negative, reflecting
the incidence
greater
of crime per
use
capita.10
of private
substitutes for policemen, or positive, reflecting a preference
for a greater number
D. Estimation
of police output units.9 In formulating the
compensation, employment,
and
model, we make anThe
additional
assumption
represent
a system
of
of equilibrium in crime
therelationships
demand
and
supply
three simultaneous equations, and they
of police employees.
are specified for estimation as linear-inlogarithms. In specifying the crime rela-

C. The Crime Equation
tionship for estimation, the amount of
crimethat
is assumed
to follow
a lagged
process
It seems plausible
in
the
longer
in and
adjusting
to changing
numbers of porun the crime rate
police
employment
licemen and to social and economic condiare simultaneously determined, hence, a
ratio
of the observed
separate equation tions.
is Therefore,
used the
to
estimate
the
values of the current crime rate (C72) to
crime rate. Ehrlich (1973) has modeled
the supply of offenses, crime, by maximiz-crime in the previous period (C71) is
ing the expected value of a person's utility specified as a power function of the ratio
function for income earned in legitimate of the equilibrium level of crime (C*) to
and illegitimate activities. He specifies his the observed value of crime in the previous
model using a system of three equationsperiod.11
Each equation in the system satisfies
which reflects the interrelations between
the rank condition for identification and

the crime rate, the expenditure on police
services, and the probability of beingthe system of equations is overidentified.

Therefore, Two-Stage Least Squares
(TSLS) is used to estimate each equation
We have modified Ehrlich's system to
in the system.12
two simultaneous equations in police employment and crime. The determinants of
caught committing the crime.

the supply of crime hypothesized here are
IV. Statistical Results
similar to Ehrlich's,

All estimated coefficients of the

C72 = CR (Np, UNEMP, Yp,
AVSS,

NW)

(6)

independent variables in the compensation equation have the expected sign and
they are statistically significant (See

Table 1). The average level of police wages
and significantly
to
where UNEMP,is positively
AVSS,
NW related
represen
the rate
level of manufacturing
wages with
unemployment
in the
city in
an elasticity of level
about 0.8. 13 The
education
the average income
in
the cit
variable has
a positive effect sentence
on the police
1970, the average
prison
s
compensation
rate and unionization
is the re
(in months) by an
offender
in
found tothe
positivelypercentage
influence the level of
state in 1960, and
of
Since white.
the weekly working
population that police
is wages.
non
hours of policemen
do not vary
among
The expected sign
of the
coefficien
cities in our sample,14 we and
may interpret
the police employment
averag
the coefficient of the union variable in
tence variables is negative, while the
expected sign of the coefficient for the the compensation equation (.161) as indiunemployment and percentage nonwhite cating that policemen who are working
variables is positive. The average family in completely unionized cities (U = 100
percent) earn about 17.5 percent more,
income variable (personal income per
thousand population) is included to reflect other things equal, than their counhigher levels of community income and terparts in cities where there is no unionization (U = 0). Our estimate for the effect
wealth and hence should be positively
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TABLE 1

Results of Estimation of Compensation,
Employment and Crime Equations

Compensation

TC= .339 (GW)"800 (e)'161«» (ED)1.«*
(¿ J-"3
P
(5. 00)** (2.25)** (2.24)** (2.04)**
Mean value of In (TC) = 9.34
S.E.E. = 0.18

R2 = .45b

Employment

N -P
.012 (TOfB)-320
CP)"1" (Y)""5
(G)"037 (¿72) "378 (POP) ^ (ED)"1" 973 (NW) " 0
X
p
p
(1.78)** (.41) (3.12)** (1.65)* (2.67)** (2.14)** (4.20)** (2.34)**
Mean value of In (N ) = . 750
P

S.E.E - .170

R2 - .68

Crime

C72 - .059 (N )~*231 (UNEMP)*065 (Y )'237 (AVSS)"*188 (NW)*027 (C71)'972
P

P

(2.28)** (1.73)* (2.60)** (2.31)** (1.41)* (19.13)**
Mean value of In (C72) ■ 3.72
S.E.E. - .09

R2 - .92

aThe figures in the parentheses are the absolute values of th

* indicates statistical significance at the 0.1 level for the appropriate t-test;
** indicates statistical signifiance at the 0.05 level. Since all the equations are
estimated using TSLS, the t-values are only asymtotically valid, and with only 79
observations they should be interpreted loosely. The simple correlations between the
logarithms of the variables do not reveal significant multicollinearity (see Table B-2).
The highest value is .56 between the logarithms of N and C71.
b
?
p
R^ is not meaningful for TSLS estimates; however, we report it, as well as the
more meaningful mean value of the natural logarithm of the dependent variable and the
standard error of the regression for the linear- in-natural logarithm form.

of unionization on policemen's salariesvariable is not statistically significant.

falls around the 6-16 percent range estiThe own price elasticity for police employment is -.320, which indicates that the
mated by Ashenfelter (1971) and the 2-18

percent range estimated by Ehrenberg
demand for police employment is price
(1973b) for firemen's wages.
inelastic. Income per thousand population
The variables in the demand equation
and per capita aid are positively related
for policemen have the expected sign and,
to the level of police employment reflectwith the exception of the price of private
ing the stimulative effect on the public
goods and grants-in-aid, are statistically
employment decision of a relaxation of
significant at the .05 level. The grant
the budget constraint. The relationship
variable is statistically significant at the between crime and employment in the
.1 level and the price of private goods
employment equation indicates that police
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structural positively
equations in employment,
employment responds
to a difference in the crime rate (in the short
compensation, and crime, an estimate of
run). The coefficient of the education
nonlabor current expenditures. The value
variable is negative, even after accountestimated for total nonlabor expenditures
has been taken of income and crime rate
per police employee (ß) in 1972, computed
as an average from the Municipal Yeardifferences, indicating a lower relative

preference for police services on the book
part 1973, is $1314. After substituting
the value of ß and the employment, crime
of more highly educated populations (see
footnote 9). The larger percentage of and
thecompensation equations into equation
(1), the equation can be differentiated with
population that is nonwhite and a larger
respect to each of the exogenous variables
population size also have a positive effect
on the number of police employees. and the aggregate response of police

expenditure per thousand population to
Ehrenberg (1972, 1973a) is the only

a change in an exogenous variable can
other author who has estimated equations
be separated into a compensation and an
comparable to our employment equation.
employment effect.16
His results also suggest a price inelastic
For example, in order to estimate the
demand for policemen - his own price

effect of differences in the level of the
elasticity estimate for police employment

is -0.281 in the short run. His result is

opportunity wage (OW) on the levels of

compensation, employment, crime, and
very close to the estimate obtained here,
expenditure, the estimated system of three
despite the fact that Ehrenberg used

simultaneous equations is totally difpooled cross-section and time series data

ferentiated with respect to OW and solved
for individual states during 1958-69.
dTC dN dC72
Estimation of the crime equation indicates that the number of police employees
dOW dOW dOW
have a dampening effect on the crime rate,
and that all the variables in the crime
then substituted into the expression prefor

in footnote 15, which is used to
equation have the expected sign and,sented
ex-

calculate the elasticity of total compensacept for unemployment, are statistically
tion, employment, and expenditure with
significant. The positive value for per
respect to OW. This process is repeated
capita income indicates that the potential
for each of the exogenous variables. The
material gain to criminal activity, proxied

of crime with respect to each
here by higher average income, haselasticity
a

of the exogenous variables (X) is calculatpositive influence on the crime rate, other
dC72
things equal. These results are consistent
directly from
with those obtained by Ehrlich (1973), ed
and

McPheters and Stronge (1974) but not

with the finding of Pogue (1975).

dX

means of C72 and the exogenous variable.

These elasticities are reported in Table
Pogue finds that police expenditures

2. on
have no statistically significant impact
The results in Table 2 suggest a difthe level of crime. However, his formulaferent interpretation of intercity variation
tion of the crime equation does not include
in per capita police expenditure than that
the lagged value of crime as an indepen-

dent variable. When crime in 1971 is

offered in the traditional determinants

literature.
Per capita police expenditures
omitted from our equation, our results
are
are
most sensitive to the level of per capita
similar to Pogue's. Thus, we conclude
that
income, the manufacturing wage, and the
the level of police employment dampens
price
the level of crime across this sample
ofof other goods. The elastic response
cities.
of police expenditures to per capita income

is primarily due to an employment ef-

fect - cities with higher per capita inV. Local Expenditure Determination
comes demand more police services - and
Derivation of a reduced-form expendi- a compensation effect resulting from the
ture equation requires, in addition to the hiring of more policemen. A one percent
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TABLE 2

Elasticities of Police Expenditure Per Thousand
Population and Crime Per Thousand Population With

Respect to Exogenous Variables3

Elasticity of
Police Expenditure
Exogenous Elasticity Per Thousand Employment
Variables of Crime Population Wage Effect Effect

Manufacturing

.058

.402

.651

-.249

Wage
Unionization

.008

Price

-.044

of

Pri-

.055

.090

.233

-.035

.046

.187

vate Goods

Income

Per

.032

1.104

.217

.887

Thousand

Population
Intergovern-

mental Aid

-.006

.035

.007

.028

.007

.027

Per Thousand

Population

Unemployment

.061

.034

Rate

Average
of Prison Sen-

Length

-.175

-.097

-.019

-.078

tence Served

aAll of the elasticities are evaluated at their mean values. The mean values of
the variables are reported in Appendix Table B-l. See Section V of the paper. for an
explanation of the derivation of the figures in the table.

higher manufacturing wage induces a
0.402 percent higher level of per capita

a lower crime rate and a lower level of

dampening effect of the higher compensation. The elasticity of police expenditure
with respect to differences in unionization,
the price of private goods, and intergovernmental aid is relatively small, when
these effects are considered separately.16

with the caution that they depend on the
result that the level of police employment
affects the crime level, and police employ-

spending by raising police expenditures
by 0.651 due to induced higher police
compensation, but lowering police expenses by 0.249 due to the employment

Two of the exogenous variables which
directly affect the crime level in this
model, unemployment and the average
sentence served, have a small effect on
the level of police expenditure. However,
the results here suggest a greater length

of sentence service is associated with both

police expenditure.
The cross-section elasticity of the crime
level is largest with respect to differences
in the average sentence served. However,

the crime effects should be interpreted

ment is statistically significant in the
crime equation only when the lagged
crime rate is included as an independent

variable.

VI. Conclusions

The very restrictive assumption of the

traditional cross-section expenditure de-

terminants model, that the price of public
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goods does not vary between units of

much of the increase being due to

government, severely limits the ability of compensation rate increases and relatively little to service (employment) level
such models to explain local public sector

increases. Second, the increase in the
behavior. We attempt to resolve this
shortcoming in a study of local govern- crime rate and the decrease in the police
ment police expenditures by combining an compensation level exerted by reduced
existing body of public finance research numbers of policemen partially reduces
with a growing body of labor economics the size of the substitution effect occaresearch dealing with the state-local gov-

sioned by any increase in the police wage

ernment sector - particularly with esti- rate. Third, these results suggest that the
mating the employment demand function level of police expenditures in a city is
and the determinants of the wage rate. significantly affected by collective barOur results suggest that important ex- gaining outcomes in both the public and
planatory variables have been excluded the private sector.
in earlier determinants studies and have
With appropriate adjustments, this
model could be extended to explain the
led to serious problems in interpreting
statistical results. Our estimation of a

level and growth in expenditures for other
state and local government functions. The
structural model facilitates interpretation
results of such analysis would likely show
of the contributions of variables to public
same results found here, i.e., that
expenditure as well as enabling us tothe
trace
expenditure levels vary among cities not
the exogenous shocks through the model
only because of variations in the need for
to their ultimate effect on employment,

services but because of variations in the
compensation and expenditure levels.
costof
of providing any given level of serCertain of the policy implications
vices.
these theoretical and empirical results
are Remedial public policy designed to
accommodate the urban fiscal problem,
particularly important. First, an increase
in real income accompanied by an e.g.,
equalgeneral revenue sharing or categori-

cal grants, must eventually recognize both
increase in the opportunity wage for public
the
sector employees is likely to result
incost
a and demand sides of the expenditure determinants equation.
substantial expenditure increase with

APPENDIX TABLE B-l

Variable Names, Description and the Mean Values

Variable
Names

TC Average annual total compensation of policemen in 1972 $ 11,769.20
OW Average annual wages of manufacturing production workers for a 40 hour work week in 1971 $ 7,864.24
U Proportion of police employees who are affiliated with a local or national union in 1968 0.69
ED Median education level of city residents who are 25 years or older in 1970 12.04
Np Number of police employees per thousand population in 1972 2.21
TC+ß Average annual total compensation of policemen plus the average value of expenditure on

nonlabor inputs per police employee in 1972 $ 13,082.77

P, Relative cost of Jiving in an SMSA in 1972^a^ 0.98
Y„ Income per thousand population in 1969 $3,270,610.00
Gp (b) Grants-in-aid per thousand population in 1972 $ 73,957.40
POP Population size in thousands in 1970
C72 Total crime per thousand population excluding accidental murder and larceny under $50
in

1972

316.35

43.17

NW Percentage of the population that is nonwhite in 1970 16.87
UNEMP Percentage of the civilian labor force that is unemployed in 1970 4.82

AVSS Average sentence served (in months) by an offender who was released from a state or federal prison for the first time in 1960 (by state) 28.75
C71 Total crime per thousand population excluding accidental murder and larceny under $50
in

1971

43.83

EXP Police expenditure per thousand population in 1972 $ 28,956.20

^The base is the average urban cost of living and is equal to 1.00.
^k^excluding education aids.
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Appendix

Yearbook 1973. All the data for the variables
which are used in the estimation with the

exception of the data on unionization were

A. Estimation of Cost of obtained
Living
from published data sources. The

mean values of
each of the
variables are reportThe cost of living index (median
level)
for
ed in Table B-l below, a correlation matrix
39 SMSA's, available from the Handbook of
Labor Statistics, is regressed on percent of the for the natural logarithms of the variables is
total employment in the SMSA in manufact- reported in Table B-2, and the data sources
for the variables are listed in Table B-3.

uring (MANEMP), region (North, NCentral,
South) and SMSA size dummy variables (POPI
for over one million, POP2 for 500,000 to
FOOTNOTES
1,000,000, and POP3 for 250,000 to 500,000).
From the results of this equation the index
1For a more complete description of the data, see
(COL) was predicted for SMSA's not in the Appendix B.

sample of 39 and the SMSA index was assumed

2 Over one hundred such studies are identified in

to hold for the central city. The estimated reviews of the expenditure determinants literature

equation is:

COL = 105.23 + 2.78 POPI + 5.50 POP2

(1.2) (1.8)

by R. Bahl (1968) and G. Wilensky (1970). For examples of determinants studies, see J. Weicher (1970),
T. Borcherding and R. Deacon (1972), T. Bergstrom
and R. Goodman (1973), and R. Gustely (1974).
3See, for example the excellent work of R. Ehrenberg

(1972), (1973a), (1973b); and J. Landon and R. Baird

- 4.62 POP3 - 0.28 MANEMP

(1971).

(1.6) (2.4)

4Ehrenberg makes a similar argument in (1973a).

6The U.S. Bureau of the Census lists current nonla-

+ 6.57 North -I- 0.66 NCentral

bor expenditures as supplies, materials and contrac-

(2.5) (.3)

tual services. More detailed lists for individual states

- 7.36 South ft2 = .65
(3.3)

are given in D. Greytak, et al. (1974, and N. Walzer

(1970).

The numbers in parentheses are the t-statistics.

B. Sample and Data Sources
The sample of 79 cities used in this study
was chosen on the basis of availability of

complete data on police department salaries and

expenditures as reported in the Municipal

6 In cities where police productivity is higher, this
higher productivity could be reflected in both higher

police wages and lower police employment, other

things being equal. Since the assumption of the same
police productivity is so important for our model, we
have selected a sample of cities for our empirical work
that, we think, minimizes the problem of productivity
differentials among cities. Because most differentials
in police productivity probably occur as a result of
different amounts of administrative personnel and /or
capital equipment per policeman, our sample consists

APPENDIX TABLE B-2

Correlation Matrix for the Natural Logarithms of the Variables
TC OW U ED N TC+ß P Y G POP C72 NW UNEMP AVSS C71 P
TC

1

OW .66 1
Ua .45 .39 1
ED .15 .02 .17

1

Np .35 .15 -.11 -.55 1
TC+ß 1.0 .66 .45 .15 .35 1

Px .26 .27 .12 .01 .18 .26 1

Yp .57 .36 .24 .50 .00 .57 .31 1

G .24 .23 -.16 -.28 .33 .24 .25 -.04 1

P

POP .13 .06 .09 -.36 .50 .13 .12 .04 .13 1
C72 .36 .33 .01 -.16 .50 .36 .17 .16 .15 .27 1
NW -.12 .03 -.28 .49 .54 -.12 -.12 -.25 .23 .39 .37 1
UNEMP .50 .50 .26 .04 .15. .50 .15 .02 .17 .18 .47 .04 1
AVSS .20 .10 .10 .18 -.24 .20 -.12 .11 -.01 -.10 -.08 -.07 .04 1

C71 .31 .26 .01 -.26 .56 .31 .14 .09 .18 .31 .96 .44 .44 -.04 1

Pz .80 .60 .46 .16 -.08 .80 .43 .61 .21 . .13 .41 -.20 .45 .15 .32 1
aU was not run in natural log-form.
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APPENDIX TABLE B-3

Data Sources3
Police compensation, police employment, and police expenditure on nonlabor

inputs and total police expenditures for 1976 are from the Municipal
Yearbook 1973.

The average hourly manufacturing wage rate in the SMSA is from Employment
and Earnings in States and Areas 1939-1971.

The union variable is the percent of policemen in the city affiliated with
a union and is from unpublished data in ICMA files.

Population, median education, median income, percentage nonwhite, per capita

income, and unemployment are from the Census of Population 1970.

The grants-in-aid variable is from Local Government Finances in Metropolitan
Areas 1972-73.

The index of the Cost of Living is from the Handbook of Labor Statistics 1973.
The crime variables are those reported in the Uniform Crime Reports for the U.S.

The average prison sentence served variable is from the National Prisoner Stat-

istics; Prisoners Released from State and Federal Institutions 1960.

aFull citations of the source publications are listed in the references.
thesis in labor economics is M. Reder
of cities with populations above 100,000 on thecompetitive
pre-

sumption that cities in this size class would (1962).
have

9 Edward Grämlich has questioned the inclusion
similar numbers of police administrative personnel
the median education variable in the demand
and amount of capital equipment per policeman, of
and,
equation
and the rationale for an expected negative
therefore, similar police productivity. We attempt
to
coefficient. Our specification of the police supply
account for remaining skill differences among policeequation follows closely that of other authors (see
men on average wage rates by including the median
1973b and Ehrenberg and Goldstein 1975).
community education level as an independent Ehrenberg
variable.
Ehrenberg's (1973b) analysis suggests that the higher
7The average wage is obtained by dividing total the median education level the greater is the supply
wage and salary payments by the number of employ- of qualified applicant public employees and, therefore,
ees. Included in payrolls are wages and salaries as the lower is the wage of public employees. However
well as overtime pay before deductions of taxes, health he estimates only the reduced-form equation for the
insurance, etc. Retirement system expenditures are demand and supply of police employees and finds that
employer contributions, excluding social security. the median education variable has a negative, althMore detailed data published by the Bureau of Labor ough statistically insignificant, effect on the level of
police wages. If our hypothesis about the positive sign
Statistics could not be used because these figures did
not cover all city government employees in any given of the median education variable in the supply equation for police is correct, then for the reduced-form
department.
8The urban wage roll-out thesis is summarized in coefficient of median education to have a negative
W. Thompson (1965): the general reference for the sign, median education should also be included in
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the demand equation, and thehave
sign
ofeffect
itsoncoefficient
a dampening
expenditures (employment
effect). The last two terms are interaction terms and
should be negative. Explanation of this negative
show the dampening effect on expenditures of the
simultaneous occurrence of higher wage rates and

relationship is not obvious, but in communities where
the education level is higher, other things equal, there
may be more reliance on private substitutes for police
services, e.g., burglar alarm systems.
10Per capita income is neither the only nor the best
measure of wealth in a community. A measurable
alternative, the percent of families with income above
$15,000, was found to be highly correlated with per
capita income. More appropriate measures of wealth
stored in homes and businesses are not available. Thus,
per capita income is used here as a proxy for higher
average levels of income and wealth. For similar

formulations of the crime equation, see Sjoquist
(1973), McPheters and Stronge (1974) and Pogue

more policemen (mix effect). This mix effect is very
small in magnitude and is not reported in Table 2.

16There is some debate in the positive public

expenditure analysis over the relative importance of
the income and grant variables as expenditure determinants. Though we have considered a restrictive
case - the police function for city governments assuming all grants to be completely fungible - the partials
of per capita police expenditures with respect to grants

and income are $0.0137 and $0.0098, respectively.

(1975).
1 1 The econometric specification of the crime relation
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